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1PSA CONFERENCE GLASGOW 2017
“Politics in Interesting Times”
Anti-politics in context: the politics of localism in London
Graham Pycock 
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster
ABSTRACT
There is a substantial body of theory on the notion of anti-politics, which is 
characterised as a widespread public disengagement from politics.  The Localism 
Act 2011 was intended to increase engagement.  This paper reviews research into 
the development of neighbourhood planning in London, so as to discern the politics 
of this leading-edge localism.  Anti-politics theory is used as a frame of reference 
and is contextualised to this London experience of civic engagement.  Three forms of 
anti-politics theory are identified; empirical, process and ideological.  The uneven 
advance of neighbourhood planning across London and the widely varying levels of 
support from borough councils leads to speculation of a contra-localism at work, 
which amounts to an additional form of anti-politics; institutional.  It is suggested that 
resistance by some councils might be explained, either by the challenge from an 
emergent deliberative democracy, or by ideological opposition to some aspects of 
neighbourhood planning in practice.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper sets out to examine the politics, or anti-politics, of “localism”.  In 
particular, to examine neighbourhood planning, as epitomising localism, which is the 
main provision of the 2011 Localism Act.  It is intended to review the ways in which 
neighbourhood planning in practice may exhibit features consistent with the various 
ideas around “anti-politics” and the related ideas of “politicisation” or “de-
politicisation”.  Definitions of these prevailing notions of anti-politics and de-
politicisation derive from mainstream political science.  The evolving practice of 
neighbourhood planning, thus far, has been empirically and theoretically reviewed 
mainly by researchers in planning, urban studies and geography.  These vocational 
disciplines are entirely politically literate and have adopted some of the ideas about 
anti-politics.  Political science as a discipline has perhaps been economical in its 
applied studies, so that anti-politics theory may benefit from wider contextualisation 
and use as a frame of reference.  Employing ideas across disciplines and attempting 
a synopsis risks a conceptual blurring.  In the field however a geographically 
widespread and substantial transfer of power has been legislated for and put into 
effect, so that a new political dynamic is being generated (according to the planners 
2and geographers). That is, a transfer of authority from representative local 
government to community groups, self-mobilised and engaged in planning and 
shaping their own identified neighbourhoods.  Thousands of practical arenas have 
been created in England where the tensions between deliberative and representative 
democracy are being played out.  The prevailing context is a so-called “anti-political” 
climate of popular disenchantment and disengagement.  The active citizen 
(especially a non-partisan one), who gets involved in local politics, is acutely aware 
of the practicalities of this political climate.  Indeed, a community campaigner for 
change who hurls themselves against the barbed wire of unresponsive officialdom, 
party political insiders and bureaucratic complexity, is likely, sooner or later, 
themselves to become disillusioned and disengaged; and thus become part of the 
problem.  On the other hand, an ambitious individual, intent on a political career, 
knows what to do.  It is not public service to “place” which matters, but service to 
party.  That is to say, across swathes of the UK, career access is determined by the 
spatial distribution of entrenched party political power; meaning safe seats, council or 
parliamentary.  Incumbency and winner take all, has disabled opponents and 
discouraged dissent.  This is to argue that the exclusionary conduct of political 
parties in power locally may constitute a form of anti-politics and that consequent 
challenges to the mainstream political parties represent an insurgent reaction.  There 
are over 2500 neighbourhood planning groups in England re-defining the 
significance of place and asserting local identity by exercising new statutory planning 
power.  This must have profound implications for the prevailing ideas about anti-
politics.  A case will be made, that at the extreme, unaccountable officials and local 
career politicians are, tactically, obstructing neighbourhood planning in London, so 
as to operate anti-politically.  Some London boroughs are demonstrably one-party 
states and a professional hegemony can be seen at work.  As local government 
elections regularly take place, a minority only cast their votes.  There is a democratic 
dysfunctionality (perhaps causally associated with anti-politics) which operates both 
locally and nationally (allowing that general election turnouts are somewhat larger).  
Although the top of the blighted tree at Westminster has all the profile, and the 
misconduct of MPs tends to define much of the anti-politics commentary, it may be 
that the rot originates at the roots, in local governance and local party politics.  An 
antipathy to neighbourhood planning, or contra-localism, in London may be 
precluding the democratically restorative possibilities of neighbourhood engagement 
in planning.  Three mainstream schools of thought about anti-politics will be identified 
and briefly examined using key literature focussed upon an exemplary author in each 
case.  These schools of thought will be identified as; empirical, process and 
ideological anti-politics.  The ideas around deliberative politics are a recurring theme 
and also appear in some of the research into neighbourhood planning.  A fourth 
depiction will be proposed, arising from London’s contra-localism, and given the term 
institutional anti-politics.  Some of the grounded research into neighbourhood 
planning by the geographers and planners will be reviewed to see how far anti-
politics theory has been consciously employed or is reflected.  The justification for 
such an eclectic approach is of course the need to situate theory in the real world so 
as to better illuminate problems while appraising the explanatory power and utility of 
anti-politics theory.
3NEIGHBOURHOOD PLANNING IN LONDON: INSTITUTIONAL ANTI-POLITICS?
There is an uneven and much slower pace of neighbourhood planning in 
London compared with the rest of England.  There are about 100 planning groups in 
London with five “made” plans (following a referendum) as against over 2500 groups 
in England overall with over 280 “made” plans (DCLG 2017).  Very much in 
character with the voluntarist nature of neighbourhood planning, the most reliable 
and regular source of data about Greater London is gathered and published by an 
activist network known as “Neighbourhood Planners London”.  This unofficial and 
independent group has an informative website; it calls occasional conferences and it 
has gently lobbied in support of neighbourhood planning (Neighbourhood Planners 
London 2017a).  The majority of members are active citizen planners supplemented 
by participation from the cottage industry of neighbourhood planning consultants.  It 
is well understood that the generally slow progress in London is largely attributable 
to the absence of parish councils and the consequent difficulties of defining 
neighbourhood planning boundaries, together with the absence of precept funding 
that parish councils can command.  Thus, aspiring neighbourhood planning groups 
in London have to agree precise boundaries and apply to their local planning 
authority (or more than one if cross-borough) for “designation” of the boundary and 
of their status as a “planning forum” (or “qualifying body”).  The same designation 
hurdle operates in the other English cities.  Unlike in rural England, where parish 
councils have statutory status, the disposition of each London borough to 
neighbourhood planning is therefore critical in obtaining designation, enabling entry 
to the process.  The politics of localism in London appears to vary greatly from 
borough to borough.  Neighbourhood Planners London (NPL) has monitored the 
progress of designations and referendums across London with an online interactive 
map and database (Neighbourhood Planners London 2017b).  The London boroughs 
of Westminster and Camden have strongly supported local groups, so that 
respectively 15 designated groups and 12 designated groups are in being.  Of the 12 
Camden designated groups, two have “made” plans following referendums.  These 
two boroughs are the exceptions and NPL has conducted an assessment of borough 
council support by reviewing their Local Plans to assess compliance with the national 
guidance on promoting neighbourhood planning (Neighbourhood Planners London 
2017c).  It is intended to “deepen the debate on why neighbourhood planning is 
taking off in some parts of the city, and not in others” (ibid p2).  The support provided 
at three assigned levels is assessed as to how far neighbourhood planning is 
promoted through the Local (borough) Plan.  Only six Local Plans fully recognise 
neighbourhood planning and provide guidance, and these include the Local Plans 
published by Westminster and Camden.  Fifteen Local Plans supply partial 
recognition, while nine Local Plans give little or no recognition to neighbourhood 
planning.  There is a general correspondence between these categories and the 
actual levels of neighbourhood planning activity in each borough.  Bromley and 
Croydon appear to have no designated neighbourhood planning groups.  According 
to the NPL report, “the distribution of neighbourhood planning activity in London is 
4patchy, with significant concentrations in some boroughs and little or no activity in 
others” (ibid p4).  The reason for such differences is ascribed to a matter of council 
policy and “cannot easily be explained by differences in urban form, geography or 
demographics” (ibid p4).  Party political control was not examined.  In fact the 
Localism Act had cross-party support in parliament in 2011 and this generally 
remains true.  In London the two boroughs with an almost complete neighbourhood 
planning geography are respectively, Conservative controlled Westminster and 
Labour controlled Camden, while the two averse borough are likewise split between 
Conservative Bromley and Labour Croydon.  The wide neighbourhood planning 
variation is not just a matter of London party politics as usual.
There has been very little research into the political and constitutional 
consequences of neighbourhood planning in London, either reviewed systematically, 
or by case study.  The absence of parish councils or their community council 
equivalent is critical.  London’s first community council (equivalent to a parish 
council) was set up in Queen’s Park, Westminster in 2014 and there is a lobby “to 
promote and support the creation of new community councils to lay the foundations 
for devolution to the neighbourhood level” (NALC 2015).  Westminster and Camden 
have demonstrated that despite the absence of parish councils, local people can 
mobilise to establish neighbourhood planning in London.  A key question is whether 
the negligible progress in other boroughs is by default, of the statutory duty to 
support neighbourhood planning, or is actually wilful opposition.  Local authorities 
are not in a position explicitly to defy an act of parliament.  Even so Richmond has a 
declared policy of promoting its “village plans” and not neighbourhood plans.  An 18 
page Neighbourhood Planning Protocol makes the case “to ensure communities 
interested in developing a neighbourhood plan are fully aware of the village planning 
process before committing to the development of a neighbourhood plan” (London 
Borough of Richmond 2014).  Waltham Forest’s Statement of Community 
Involvement proposes to retain control of the process by “encouraging the 
preparation of neighbourhood plans as 'Community Plans'.  Depending on the scope 
and nature of the proposals, these may be adopted as a “Supplementary Planning 
Document” (London Borough of Waltham Forest 2014).  A position paper produced 
for the Neighbourhood Planners London group listed eight blocking tactics employed 
by local authorities which included the imposition of various delays, now largely 
prevented by tighter DCLG regulation (Burton T. 2015).  There appears to be an 
institutional reluctance to replace in-house community planning or community 
engagement programmes with the more radically autonomous neighbourhood 
planning approach.  There are examples of more direct opposition.  For example 
Lambeth Council spent £140,000 producing a “refreshed masterplan” in preference 
to supporting an aspiring neighbourhood planning group, “The programme will feed 
into Lambeth’s Local Plan in 2016, and a co-productive approach will be undertaken 
throughout the large scale engagement strategy” (London Borough of Lambeth 
2016).  Neighbourhood planning was mentioned once, as one of five identified risk 
factors (ibid p7).  
In a PSE conference paper exploring localism as a form of “restorative 
politics”, some of the many obstacles to neighbourhood planning in London were 
5identified.  These included weak civic leadership, the problem of contested 
boundaries, shortage of planning officers, reluctance of councillors to compromise 
their positional power and a lack of appropriate or sufficient organisational capacity 
in the community (Pycock G. 2016).  The professionals and experts interviewed for 
the paper were well aware of the problems but remained very positive, for example; 
“previously planning was ‘decide then consult’ but localism was ‘consult then decide’.  
This involves an intensely democratic process” (ibid p15). There was concern about 
unreasonable and unrealistic demands placed upon citizens.  Neighbourhood 
planning requires professional knowledge or access to paid consultants.  It requires 
administration, continuous community engagement, and of course political skills.  
These factors apply London-wide so how to explain the variation in neighbourhood 
planning activity between boroughs?  It is remarkable that several London boroughs 
may be withholding support or even actively opposing neighbourhood planning.  
Such a phenomenon of contra-localism would explain the limited progress in such 
boroughs.  It may be that the radical shift of power implied by neighbourhood 
planning, from the local authority to the community, has provoked a (multi-party) 
political resistance.  A comprehensive critique of London borough governance is 
hard to find in the literature, but the case for a massive democratic deficit is easily if 
polemically summarised.  Some London councils have become oligarchic and 
centralist.  The cabinet system introduced by the Local Government Act 2000 has 
created an executive elite of councillors meeting and determining policy in private 
(the “informal cabinet”) with like-minded officers.  This so-called informal cabinet is a 
one-party cabal prone to group think and confirmation bias.  Formal cabinet 
meetings in public are simply a publicity platform for announcing policy.  The 
necessary checks and balances are ineffectual.  Poorly serviced scrutiny committees 
are not part of the policy community and are routinely ignored.  Generous special 
responsibility allowances enable cabinet councillors to operate as professional 
politicians and equip them with a powerful system of financial patronage.  Ward 
councillors are encouraged to concentrate on casework and the promotion of council 
policy, locally. Opposition councillors, who should provide the critical element of 
accountability, are marginalised and poorly supported, where they exist.  Five 
London boroughs have four or fewer opposition councillors, of which councils, two 
have none (London Councils 2014).  With consistently low percentage turnouts at 
elections, the ruling parties typically represent a derisorily low proportion of the 
electorate.  In this scenario, resistance to the fundamental challenge of 
neighbourhood planning would not be surprising.
At its simplest, politics can be described as “winning and using power to 
govern society” (Collins 2010).  Elaboration of this definition encompasses liberal 
politics, with the necessary conditions of free speech, the rule of law etc.  
Inescapably, by this basic definition, neighbourhood planning is to carry out the 
practice of politics.  It is a political activity.  But many groups engaged in 
neighbourhood planning, as with community groups in general, reject this definition, 
describing themselves explicitly as “apolitical” or “non-political”.  That politics and its 
practice is deemed as undesirable is a common view (anti-politics), which is not 
confined to the unsophisticated.  In a paper by a former Permanent Secretary of the 
Cabinet Office, about a dangerous “politicisation of the civil service”, the essential 
6propriety of “non-political” public servants was emphasised (Mountfield R. 2002).  In 
day to day usage, “office politics” is regarded as undesirable and to be deplored.  So, 
the widespread disengagement and disenchantment of the general public with 
politics and politicians, described by political scientists as anti-politics, did not 
suddenly emerge at the time of the MP’s expenses scandal in 2014.  There is an 
ambient scepticism.  According to Jeremy Paxman (2002) “Does it matter if people 
stop believing in politicians?  In the short term, perhaps not much: the British people 
have always held them in healthily low regard”.  Paxman goes on to warn however 
about the dangers of a complete loss of faith.  The little reported democratic deficits 
discussed earlier, of the allegedly oligarchical London boroughs, arguably constitute 
a distinct form of anti-politics; institutional anti-politics.  Public concern is very much 
about the conduct of politics, the avoidance of abuses of power and the observance 
of the conditions of liberal democracy.  But these nuances are not clearly discerned.  
A simplified negative connotation is applied to political activity which is pervasive.  
There is undoubtedly a strong antipathy to political parties, to ‘taking the party line’ 
and to point scoring.  Community groups, on reflection, might agree that they wish to 
be seen collectively as, “non-partisan” rather than, “non-political”.  It is easy to exploit 
this popular misconception of politics.  The TV Question Time guest able to say, ‘I 
am not a politician of course’ is inviting the ascription of unsullied authority and 
absence of taint.  Councillors and especially cabinet members (often 
indistinguishable from council officers sitting alongside on the platform) will affect to 
be above politics and apparently impartial.  Opponents and critical members of the 
public (normally excluded from the platform) are vulnerable to the accusation of 
“being political”, thus incurring opprobrium.  Suppression of dissent by incumbent 
politicians in this way further debases the political currency and is profoundly anti-
political.  Dominant or oligarchical political groups, posited above, have effectively 
inhibited or precluded healthy political discourse.  This phenomenon, of exploiting 
the popular misconception of politics so as to stifle debate, is another aspect of an 
institutional anti-politics.
ANTI-POLITICS AS DISENGAGEMENT; AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE
In his prize-winning examination of anti-politics, Gerry Stoker’s (2006), Why politics 
Matters, supplies a pragmatic, comprehensive and empirically-based synopsis.  The 
general proposition, through an analysis of causes and pathologies, is that there is a 
widespread disenchantment and disengagement with politics and politicians.  
Throughout this consideration, of low voter turnout, breakdown in trust and so on, 
Stoker is posing the question as to how far this is a crisis and if so, is it a crisis of 
leadership (culpable politicians) or a crisis of followership (apathetic citizens denying 
their own agency)? In his defence of representative democracy, he emphasises the 
importance of efficacy in governance and argues the requirement for “a politics for 
amateurs”.  “Politics in democratic societies needs more than effective leaders and 
activists and a silent patient citizenry.  It also requires citizen engagement” (ibid 
p149).  His search for solutions and reforms includes a review of localism, defined 
as, “devolving power and resources towards front-line managers, local democratic 
structures and local consumers and communities” (ibid p 176).  Stoker endorses 
7localism as; providing a base or site for better engagement in politics, as a means of 
employing local knowledge and linking this to higher levels of governance.  Crucially, 
localism “enables the dimensions of trust, empathy and social capital to be fostered” 
(ibid p176).  According to Stoker, there are two serious objections.  The first is the 
danger of narrow parochialism and “not in my back yard” (NIMBYism) politics.  
Nevertheless Stoker welcomes local tensions and says, “conflict between interests 
and their resolution remains at the heart of politics, wherever it is conducted” (ibid 
p177).  The second objection raised is the need to address inequalities faced by 
different communities and to recognise “both diversity in communities and a concern 
with equity issues” (ibid p177).  This edition was published in 2006, pre-financial 
crash, and a third objection, reinforcing the second one, must surely be added, about 
the difficulty of devolving power within the budgetary constraints and contradictions 
of austerity in local government.  Although localism (and its neighbourhood planning 
variant) is a reform which may be worthwhile in tackling anti-politics, this is probably 
conditional on overcoming these three objections.  
Thus empirical anti-politics is a topical, loose-fit title for a bundle of political 
woes, dysfunctionalities and public discontent.  Jennings and Stoker (2014) have 
plotted survey evidence of this increasing and now entrenched popular 
disillusionment with politics.  They note “anti-politics is reflected in two dimensions: 
negative attitudes towards politicians, institutions and broadly the political system 
and a withdrawal from formal politics” (ibid 2014).  In diagnosing the factors in this 
they emphasise distrust of the “political class”.  A report from the British Academy, 
(Building a new politics?) identifies the problem of political disengagement in these 
empirical terms and explores two remedial perspectives (Stoker 2011).  The political 
“engineers”, situated in a protective or pluralist paradigm seek to restore faith in the 
existing representative system.  A reform agenda would include; proportional 
representation (local this time), more power for parliament over the executive, 
devolved power to local governance and greater transparency.  The engineers’ focus 
on “a radical overhaul of the way representative politics works in response to anti-
political sentiment” (ibid p38).  This engineers’ viewpoint has been updated, post-
Brexit and re-focussed as addressing a populist anti-political angst.  Substantial 
focus group and survey evidence suggests that a “sunshine” set of attitudes favours 
reform of representative democracy.   Citizens want to make “representative 
democracy work in practice the way they think it should, such that their confidence in 
politics as a governing process might be restored” (Stoker G. and Hay C. 2016 p21).  
The “designers” who favour a developmental paradigm, argue for a more direct form 
of political engagement, “in which citizens are encouraged to become better 
informed and to debate, deliberate and judge what is in the common good” (ibid 
p40).  A recent re-appraisal of deliberative democracy criticises current thinking 
which replaced the earlier “empirical turn” (Owen D. and Smith G. 2016).  The case 
is made for an idealistic stance “that extends the conception of deliberative 
democracy to take into account the deliberative characteristics of the political system 
as a whole” (ibid p214).  The discursive attributes of neighbourhood planning await 
the sort of detailed reviews and trials carried out in the empirical phase.  The 
designers’ deliberative democracy approach also emphasises the social justice 
argument about differential access to the system and advocates innovation enabling 
8all citizens to engage.  Neighbourhood planning is undoubtedly creating new spaces 
for local engagement and community-led discourses.  So far there is little evidence 
of change in traditional patterns of participation in terms of socio-economic groups, 
ethnicity etc.  There is an expectation in the Localism Act, and certainly an appetite 
on the ground, for neighbourhood planning groups to be genuinely representative of 
their communities.  There is scope for a major experiment in deliberative democracy 
here.  At the same time neighbourhood planning offers an opportunity for a renewal 
of representative democracy.  Apparently, from the London experience, councillors 
may perceive a threat, where community groups can by-pass ward councillors and 
the town hall, determining planning policy for themselves.  An alternative legitimacy 
is later conferred by referendum.  There are examples (but surprisingly this is not the 
norm) where local councillors have played a key role, contributing to and 
championing neighbourhood planning.  This may enhance both their own status and 
also the efficacy of local representative democracy.  There appears to be little 
research.  As a potential next stage within localism policy, the opportunity exists for a 
neighbourhood planning group to petition their local council for a governance review, 
with a view to setting up a community council with identical tax precepting power to 
parish councils in non-urban areas.  There is one in existence in London with 12 
non-partisan councillors representing Queens Park ward in Westminster.  The British 
Academy report strongly advocates reform employing ideas from both the 
participative and representative democracy paradigms.  The innovation of 
neighbourhood planning in rural and urban England, and its unfolding political 
practices, offer an innovative and huge test bed, which already engages tens of 
thousands of people, for both the reformist “engineers” and the deliberative 
democracy “designers”.
ANTI-POLITICS AS AN IDEOLOGICALLY-DRIVEN CONCEPT
Schedler’s many research papers and books are frequently cited and have 
been influential, not least in literature concerning localism.  It is argued here that his 
notion of an anti-politics which is essentially driven by a neoliberal ideology is itself, 
simply ideological.  In Schedler’s edited collection, The End of Politics? (1997), he 
sets the scene in his introductory chapter: “Antipolitics; Closing or Colonizing the 
Public Sphere” (also separately available online).  Schedler proposes two sets of 
anti-political concepts or forces.  He distinguishes between the concept of the denial 
or banishment of politics (“closing”), and the concept of conquering or replacing 
politics, (“colonising”).  These concepts are partly described in terms of ideational 
phenomena and partly in terms of ideologically wilful acts.  In his first set, four anti-
political ideologies reject or banish the premises upon which his functional definition 
of democracy depends: “Instead of collective problems they see a self-regulating 
order; instead of plurality they perceive uniformity; instead of contingency they state 
necessity; and instead of political power they proclaim individual liberty” (ibid p3).  
Schedler’s first “closing” ideology is described as Public Action versus Self-
regulation where public action is necessarily political, but private action, such as 
exchange through markets, is non, or anti-political.  This is a binary opposition, 
although the boundaries are not fixed and are the “objects of continual struggle” (ibid 
9p4).  Schedler argues that neoliberal ideas to minimise the state and create self-
regulating societies relying on market competition are the embodiment of this 
ideology.  However, “public action”, as coined by Schedler, is difficult to distinguish 
from “state” action, and in practice self-regulation is always bounded by regulation 
and law.  In reality, this ideological contrast may be about the enduring issue of the 
balance between the public and private sectors.  Politics or anti-politics is potentially 
operational in either sector, democracy permitting.  In any case neighbourhood 
planning clearly comes under public action.  Schedler secondly posits the idea of 
Plurality versus Uniformity, where there are attempts to create uniform societies 
with politics presented as redundant or actually divisive; “various ideologies have 
indeed bred anti-political fantasies of consensual, conflict-free reconciled 
communities” (ibid p6).    Schedler cites generic exemplars of uniformity; in populism, 
nationalism, Marxism and religious fundamentalism.  However to take an actual 
example, North Korea would perhaps serve as a model of politics closed, but 
coercion may be the obvious proximate cause of such anti-political uniformity.  
Arguably, uniformity is utterly uncharacteristic of democratic states and localism is 
certainly plural, entertaining multiple situated political discourses.  The third ideology 
of anti-politics is described as Contingency versus Necessity, where it is noted 
that politics operates with contingencies as they arise, generating options and 
determining courses of action.  Tradition can constrain politics, but today it has “to 
impose itself, above all, against the nearly overwhelming dynamic of the market 
economy” (ibid p7).  In particular, democratic politics “has hopelessly fallen behind 
the global expansion of capitalism, technology and culture” (ibid p7).  This diagnosis 
of the loss of national sovereignty brought about by globalisation identifies a guilty 
party in the form of “neoliberal technocrats” (global corporations would be more 
plausible), who wilfully disempower politics and “celebrate its impending 
disappearance” (ibid p8).  For Schedler to impute common (anti-political) motives to 
an all-powerful neoliberal group is merely a conspiracy theory.  Globalisation, which 
is economically dynamic, creates new contingencies (in both the developing and 
developed worlds) as well as removing old ones.  The fourth ideology acting to 
abolish or negate politics is probably the least potent one.  Authority versus 
Anything Goes accepts that order and compliance must be imposed by the state as 
a legitimate and necessary political function.  Schedler calls in aid a preference for 
Hannah Arendts notion of mutual obligation rather than top-down coercion.  The 
forces of individualisation, anti-authoritarianism and anarchical impulse are posited 
as amounting to an anti-political ideology.  However, politics is hardly banished 
merely by opting-out and localism enlists citizens opting in.
Schedler’s second set of notion of an anti-political “colonising” of the public 
sphere concerns the two means by which politics can be subverted, either through 
social sub-systems or ideas “This colonial variety of anti-politics concedes the 
functional value of politics but denies that it ought to be conducted according to its 
own laws and logic” (ibid p 10).  In contrast to the blunt “closing” ideologies 
presented as consciously intent on replacing politics, this colonialist 
conceptualisation of anti-politics is contemplative in style and democratically 
normative.  This explanation draws in aid both Habermas and Arendt.  In considering 
Politics and Language, Schedler declares that the borders of modern politics are 
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the outcome of conflict where social sub-systems (markets, technology and family) 
try to impose their own values.  Arendt’s definition of liberal democracy, as 
embracing equality, freedom and deliberation, is enlisted.  Having committed to such 
norms of liberal politics, Schedler volunteers “language” as the defining normative 
attribute.  In particular: deliberation by free participants, rationality through 
discussion, and the force of argument rather than violent force, “The word stands 
against the sword, the logic of arguments against the logic of power and war” (ibid p 
11).  Here Schedler moves to advocacy, posing the deliberative version of 
democracy against conventional party-based representative democracy, “The 
consensual norm of deliberation may run counter to the majoritarian norm of 
electoral accountability” (ibid p 12).  The preference for deliberative democracy is 
explicit, and neighbourhood planning would seem to conform.  It is conceivable that 
technology or markets, and so on, might subvert or “colonise” the politics of localism.  
Schedler establishes the importance of discursive or deliberative politics in normative 
terms, and we are left with the assertion that the “language” in politics is imperative 
and that colonising social sub-systems might detract from this essential.  The second 
feature of anti-political “colonisation” is that of Partial Rationalities.  Schedler, 
borrowing from Habermas, elaborates on how communicative rationality may be 
subverted by alternative rationalities.  Firstly, politics can be reshaped instrumentally 
when technocrats assert their expert knowledge so that political discussion by non-
experts is discredited as ill-informed and unhelpful.  Ironically this anticipates the 
anti-expert populism which has become prominent and controversial following the 
“Brexit” referendum.  The pre-eminence of expert commentary (and how this is 
popularly received) is, according to Schedler potently anti-political.  The chance of 
capture by experts is much reduced in neighbourhood planning however compared 
with conventional council-led consultations.  Secondly, Schedler depicts rational-
choice conceptions as flooding the political realm with private choices and motives.  
Potentially this utility-maximisation results in “political corruption” (ibid p 13).  This is 
where the market economy supposedly removes publically determined choices.  A 
new neighbourhood-based tier of town planning is surely an exercise in fine tuning 
the regulations, although this does not rule out individual or collective rational-choice 
decisions.  A presumption or bias in favour of development, as such, is certainly built 
into the Localism Act and some researchers equate this to neoliberalism.  Thirdly, a 
moral form of anti-politics is proposed which undermines political debate by asserting 
moral principles which are prescriptive.  This fundamentalist anti-politics deplores 
dissent and “rejects consequentialist ways of ethical reasoning” (ibid p 13).  There is 
no evidence of any form of moral absolutism in neighbourhood planning.  Schedler’s 
fourth and final anti-political “rationality” is an aesthetic one where the power of 
images subverts politics.  Drama, music, sports, advertising and TV are specifically 
indicted as symbolic acts prevailing over substantive verbal communication.  In 
particular there is an anti-politics of “comforting ritual over the disturbing experience 
of learning” (ibid p 13).  This is an entirely plausible form of anti-politics, supposing 
as it does the ordering of the emotive and expressive above the rational.  This idea is 
found in Wood’s notion of politicisation below.  This notion, pre-social media, with an 
emphasis on the emotive aspect of the aesthetic, may represent prototype “post-
truth” politics.  Again this is not an obvious feature of neighbourhood planning, 
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although a reinvigorated and newly inspired sense of local identity has an aesthetic 
dimension.  To summarise, Schedler offers two forms or families of thought about 
anti-politics; that of an abolition or closing of politics; and that of an anti-political 
colonisation.  These are global and summative notions from a Gramcian perspective.  
Schedler portrays a neoliberal hegemony ideologically attacking the social purposes 
of politics so as to replace contestation and deliberation with the imperatives of 
privatisation and the marketplace.  It is difficult not to conclude that Schedler’s 
specification of the anti-political is itself ideologically-driven. The “public sphere” is 
enabled in the liberal democracy to challenge any ideology discursively which is 
what Schedler does.  No evidence is produced to demonstrate that the neoliberal 
ideologies identified do actually close or replace the essential political characteristics 
of the public sphere.  It might be reasonable to conclude that Schedler’s ideologies 
simply represent politics in action, but betray neoliberal characteristics of which 
Schedler disapproves.  The functioning of the (local) state and its potential for anti-
politics is unexplored.  It is difficult to deploy these ideologies so as to define 
neighbourhood planning as anti-political.  Nevertheless some of Schedler’s ideas 
have been called in aid to help appraise localism.
ANTI-POLITICS AS OUTCOME OF A DEPOLITICISATION PROCESS
Matthew Wood’s (2015) paper on policy paradigm shifts supplies an up to 
date and elaborated explanation of “politicisation” and “depoliticisation”, with distinct 
definitions of these polar opposites.  The paper is placed in the context of policy 
analysis of how paradigms are changed.  Wood juxtaposes three key ideas; social 
learning, as advanced by Hall P. (1993), paradigmatic change and deliberative 
democracy.  These contributions reinforce comments elsewhere about deliberative 
democracy and supply the two additional dimensions of “social learning” and 
“paradigmatic change” for the purpose of reviewing localism policy.  Wood argues 
that a policy paradigm can be reframed or alternatively reinforced by non-rationalistic 
rhetorical appeals which are emotive or normative.  There is some correspondence 
here with Schedler’s aesthetic rationality.  Policy actors have agency.  “We may 
hence define (de)politicisation as the rhetorical recognition or denial by humans of 
their capacity to alter their collective practices, institutions and social conditions” 
(italics in the original) (ibid p 10).  Further; “Politicisation involves disputing the 
underlying assumptions that guide society and depoliticisation involves entrenching 
such assumptions” (ibid p 10).  As an aside, the Brexit and Trump outcomes in the 
following year would thus be identified as politicisation.  Wood is interested in aiding 
the analysis of change empirically and indicates the arenas in which discursive 
(de)politicisation practically takes place.  The process occurs, in one direction or the 
other, in contexts where discourses are binary and partisan, and typically resources 
of expertise, time and money are short.  Party conferences epitomise such venues 
where, “partisan rhetorical flourishes and simple narratives are used to elicit 
audience responses and to reinforce and mobilise political cleavages” (ibid p 15).  
Tabloid Newspapers indulge in binary narratives constrained as they are by tight 
deadlines and editorial policy.  Wood quotes research indicating that online forums, 
blogs and social media host partisan communities with discourses within rather than 
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between themselves deploying narrow viewpoints and rhetorical tools.  Such 
methods and conditions do not pertain in the local planning context where 
discourses are slow, complex and multifaceted and typically policy development is 
incremental.  There may be rhetoric and emotion but not the advocacy of radical or 
partisan opposites.  Crucially however planning policy is refined or developed, that is 
to say positively changed (otherwise why bother with neighbourhood planning) but 
there is no paradigmatic shift.
With respect to social learning and deliberative democracy, Wood’s particular 
contribution is the production of a framework which enables the quality of 
deliberation and discourse to be discerned.  Wood’s depiction of (de)politicisation is 
posed and contrasted with “social learning” explanations of policy paradigm change 
as advanced by Hall P. (1993).  Hall’s essentially institutionalist framework is 
critiqued.  The framework, with its three orders of change; instrumental, changed 
techniques and paradigmatic change, is criticised for an under-emphasis on the 
agency of policymakers.  Wood complements Hall’s causal process of social learning 
with his notion of change via (de)politicisation.  There are many explanations of how 
change is effected, especially from organisational studies, but social learning is a 
well-established concept.  Here it is posited as an explanation of change where 
goals or techniques are modified by rational consideration of externally supplied 
feedback.  The process involves testing, learning and revision, although externalities 
are critical, such as public opinion.  Citizen planners, supported by professionals, 
devise policy and engage in continuous consultation with the local community over 
several months.  This social learning definition is as close as may be to describing 
the process of neighbourhood planning.  Ultimately, an election creates authority for 
change or in the case of neighbourhood planning, a referendum.  In stark contrast to 
the processes of paradigmatic shift through (de)politicisation, social learning implies 
expert knowledge and extensive resources, financial and professional, together with 
expertise from academics, practitioners and professional bodies.  Wood locates such 
a capacity in places such as judicial reviews, parliamentary select committees and 
think tanks.  Allegedly, such policy-making resists high-level philosophising and 
focusses on outcomes at the instrumental and technical level.  This constitutes Hall’s 
first and second order change, short of altering fundamental goals and norms.  
Wood’s (de)politicisation process produces actors of a psychological and partisan 
disposition to prompt debate leading to the third level of paradigmatic change.  There 
may be an exaggerated dichotomy here.  The social learning model of policy change 
is rational and incremental and surely political.  At the same time the contribution of 
rhetorical actors will not always be transformational and may support or empower 
instrumental and technical change through social learning.  Wood’s distinction is 
perhaps between high-politics, de-personalised, evidence-based and incremental, 
and low-politics, which is rhetorical, emotive and either radical or reaffirming.  This 
definition of (de)politicisation is certainly distinctive, and Wood’s definition neatly 
anticipated ideas of a “post-truth politics” which followed the Brexit/Trump upsets of 
2016.  The features of (de)politicisation involving rhetoric, normative appeals and 
antipathy to experts are claimed to be characteristic of the anti-establishment camps 
in these arguably paradigmatic shifts.  Wood concludes by suggesting that his 
combined framework of social learning and (de)politicisation, with appropriate 
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balance between the two, has merit and resonance with discourses about 
deliberative democracy.  The interpretation of anti-politics as a phenomenon 
resulting from, or caused by, depoliticisation supplies a template.  The process of 
“politicisation” tends to promote political action, whereas the process of 
“depoliticisation” tends to replace or detract from political action, resulting in anti-
politics.   For the purposes of analysing the situated practices of localism, it can be 
supposed that the citizen actors, by their agency, contribute to a process of 
politicisation.  This may in some degree be characteristic of deliberative democracy.
THE POLITICS OF NEIGHBOURHOOD PLANNING
Neighbourhood planning can be described as the current leading-edge of 
localism, where “local” is at the subsidiary or parish level, close to the people.  There 
are numerous localism precedents restrained by limited delegation of powers and 
strict controls and targets.  In reality the town hall holds the budget and remains 
accountable for any service delivery.  What is astute about the devolution at the 
neighbourhood level of planning is that the problems of political and financial 
accountability for service delivery, simply do not exist.  Authority (not resource) is 
transferred from the town hall to the designated local group.  A new tier of town 
planning has been created and offered to the citizens.  The eventual “made” 
neighbourhood plan has statutory force and even a plan in the process of drafting is 
a “material consideration” in any local planning application.  It is difficult to argue that 
this form of devolution is insubstantial, or politically insincere, or anti-political.  
Research by Clarke and Cochrane (2013) reviewed the explicit intentions of the 
Localism Act in the form of official documents and announcements.  Their case study 
of this legislation is a critique of the government’s notion of “localism” and juxtaposes 
this with concepts of “anti-politics”.  Clarke and Cochrane conclude that, “this 
localism seeks to replace New Labour’s technocratic government, but it appears to 
be doing so with just another form of anti-politics; naïve, populist liberalism” (ibid  
p28).  Reviewing alternative definitions of localism, the authors take the view that 
“contemporary localism makes for a complicated picture and is best conceptualised 
as spatial liberalism” (ibid p16).  They argue that the legislation replaces the content 
of politics with assumed unities of local populations and with technologies such as 
markets, and define an “instrumental anti-politics” where “technocratic experts 
colonise the space of politics” (ibid p23).  Thus Clarke and Cochrane at the time of 
enactment infer and anticipate anti-political consequences to the Localism Act.  
Later, Williams, Goodwin and Cloke (2014) argue that localism is profoundly 
neoliberal, promoting individualism and market-based technologies which are 
inimical to local democracy.  Nevertheless Williams et al actually endorse the 
subversive value of transfers of power to the neighbourhood, suggesting that protest 
groups can acquire the agenda.  Thus; “the changing architecture of governance 
brought about through the drive towards localism has opened up opportunities for 
the direct appropriation of governmental structures by local groups seeking 
progressive outcomes” (ibid p2809).  Schedler’s ideological definitions of anti-politics 
are directly employed in Clarke’s “Geographies of politics and anti-politics”, where 
anti-politics is the replacement of politics by self-regulating orders (especially market 
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forces), uniformity and necessity (populism), and also by alternative rationalities such 
as information technology (Clarke 2015).    Clarke notes the arguments that a 
political elite has, for essentially careerist reasons, adopted a strategy of 
“depoliticisation” which creates the consequent public disengagement; a logical 
relationship of; “cause (elite strategies of depoliticisation) and effect (citizen 
negativity towards formal politics)” (ibid p191).  The Schedler-inspired ideological 
definition of anti-politics has been enlisted by a number of authors, but Clarke also 
adopts Wood’s process notion of anti-politics.  This paper contends however that 
neighbourhood planning operates in the opposite direction, as a process of 
politicisation, which is pro-political.
The issue of ideology has been illuminated by Davoudi and Madanipour 
(2015) who adopt Foucault’s notion of “governmentality”, or the art and technology of 
government, as the frame of reference.  The attraction of localism is acknowledged 
as the populist appeal of “romantic images of small groups bound together through 
cultural and geographical ties and collaborate reciprocally and locally to find local 
solutions for local problems” (ibid, p78).   But localism is simply a mentality of 
government and in particular of liberal government.  They trace an evolution from 
classical liberalism through welfare liberalism to a post-1970s neoliberalism.  The 
criticisms of Hayek and Friedman of the big state are explored, “welfarist liberals 
consider the state as the necessary regulator and keeper of the social order” (ibid, 
p86).  For the neoliberal mentality, “it is the market that governs the state and not 
vice versa” (ibid, p87).  A retreat from concerns with social justice is regretted and it 
is suggested that localities, “as the new imagined collectivity, are expected to be 
responsible for their own conduct and their own fates” (ibid, p94).  This is a hostile 
view (reflecting Schedler’s) and supposes that cracks are appearing in 
neighbourhood planning “localism’s flagship policy”.  One such crucial flaw is, “the 
anti-political tendencies of localism that invade and colonise politics by technocratic 
and calculative practices” (ibid, p98).  Schedler’s 1997 view of anti-politics is extant 
and influential.  As an ideological perspective this analysis is obviously contestable 
and would have to be sustained by the evidence.  There are recent contributions 
which adopt a similar perspective but reject the anti-political accusation.  While 
expressing concern about neoliberal agendas, “the ideal is to cut down the size of 
the state…to leave the field for market processes and civil society initiative” (Healey 
P. 2015, p114) advocates a “more progressive place-based governance” (ibid, 
p120).  A grounded and pragmatic case is made for building civic capacity through, 
“collective experiences of ‘doing’, ‘deliberating’, ‘learning; and ‘reflecting’.” (ibid, 
p115).  This corresponds closely to Wood’s social learning as a means of 
politicisation.  Healey does not abandon representative government but argues for 
“place governance….informed by many forms of knowledge including that of 
planners” (ibid, p119).  Suitable community values for planning activity and the 
components of capacity are defined and set out.  This is a menu for a politicising 
form of localism which has clear deliberative features.
The most recent research is better grounded in the emerging practice of 
neighbourhood planning, while retaining an ideological edge.  Bradley Q. (2017) 
suggests that neighbourhood planning may be an extension of a radical tradition of 
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grassroots challenge and protest against the system.  It is logical to interpret 
neighbourhood planning as “a political practice founded on the inevitability of 
antagonism and conflict” (ibid, p39).  Although concerned about spatial inequalities 
and the danger of affluent areas exerting privileged influence, Bradley concedes “the 
binary dichotomies between civic interest and narrow self-interest breaks down even 
in studies of affluent place-based groups…A more complex struggle between 
alternative visions of the common good emerges” (ibid, p43).  He argues that place 
and identity are crucial and that a form of participative democracy is emerging from 
neighbourhood planning.  The nearest we have to an official review of 
neighbourhood planning is the User Experience Study by Locality for the Department 
of Communities & Local Government which evaluated its support for planning groups 
(Parker G. et al 2014).  A national pattern emerged very quickly of an uneven take 
up with wide differences in community capability.  Some communities can draw upon 
skills, expertise and networks to access with confidence their right to plan locally.  
The heavy burden on time and goodwill over a long period, together with the crucial 
importance of a supportive local authority, was highlighted.  Locality currently funds 
groups up to £15,000, which is more a pump primer.  Based upon London figures the 
typical costs of a neighbourhood planning project run to about £100,000 in cash or 
kind.  The most recent data (Parker 2016) indicates a preponderance of designated 
groups in the South East (22% of the national total) and South West (22%).  London 
is lagging far behind with only 4% of the national total of groups (ibid, p82).  A 
mapping exercise, using Indices of Multiple Deprivation Data ranked by quartiles 
does suggest a clear link between groups reaching a referendum and affluence (ibid, 
p84).  It is hardly surprising that London is well behind.  Apart from the complexities 
of agreeing boundaries and the absence of parish council resources, there is the 
notable absence of council support from many boroughs.  All of which compounds 
the difficulties faced by the less affluent London areas.  “Intermediary input” from the 
borough council and consultants has been critical to success nationally (ibid, p88).  
Two case studies of early groups, Upper Eden, Cumbria and North Shields, 
demonstrated the practical problems of capacity and of community tensions and 
technical complexity (McGuinness D. and Ludwig C. 2017).  In one case, a local 
planning officer wrote the plan, in the other, a consultant.  This professional “turned 
away from the notion of community-led planning and instead compromised by 
emphasising the community ‘taking ownership’ of the final plan” (ibid, p110).  This 
reality check of the necessity of technical expertise (or a division of labour) does not 
detract from the shift from conventional top-down planning to local ownership.  In the 
default model local knowledge is first harvested (the public working for the planners) 
and plans are drawn up in the town hall.  Subsequent consultation appears more like 
promotion and elicits little public response.  The discredited reality of this 
conventional model is conveyed in some verbatim accounts of neighbourhood 
planning actors from Linton near Leeds.  Voice two says, “We began to feel that the 
new plan was being imposed upon us.  We started our plan in direct confrontation 
with them” (Bradley Q. and Brownhill S. (2016, p116).  In this case study Leeds City 
Council decided to promote neighbourhood planning and, allowing for different 
capacities, supplied differentiated support, where even high capacity parish councils 
obtained “a pretty high level of planning support” (ibid, p121).  The issue of 
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domination by a self-selected and affluent group is recurrent.  A related question is 
how far planning groups can actually represent the diversity of the neighbourhood?  
This has major salience in London.  A rare case study from London examined the 
wayward and exceptional conduct of two rival groups in Hackney (Colomb C. 2017).  
The author is concerned that there is weak guidance in the Localism Act and from 
local authorities as to how urban diversity can be ensured and demonstrated when 
groups apply for designation.  In Hackney two rival groups, comprised of differing 
coalitions of ethnic, religious, party political and civic interests, applied for an 
overlapping area.  Hackney Council eventually asserted local government authority 
and imposed a council-led resolution.  This odd case perhaps highlights the inability 
of representative democracy to supply civic leadership in the first place and a lack of 
the necessary trust essential for unified community endeavour.  A reportedly 
acrimonious clash of rivalries over neighbourhood planning acted as a catalyst for 
the council and eventually a geographically smaller and more consensual group was 
designated.  An apparently anti-political status quo was challenged by competitive 
factions seeking to exploit the Localism Act.  Whether a politicisation process 
successfully resolves conflict to produce a neighbourhood plan commanding wide 
respect will be revealed by the eventual referendum result.  Colomb (2017) poses 
the question as to whether neighbourhood planning has the potential for division and 
exclusion.  Her tentative conclusion implicitly endorses the politicisation thesis since 
groups may, “genuinely seek to reach out to a wider section of the local population, 
out of political belief, pragmatic necessity or the search for consensus around the 
future of a ‘place’ that they care about” (ibid p140).  This unusually problematic 
Hackney case may recommend itself as demonstrating that localism can deliver 
deliberative democracy so as to achieve improved community cohesion, but also the 
prospect of a reinvigorated representative democracy.  In any case Colomb stresses 
the need for more research.
CONCLUSION
The focus of this paper is the prominent issue of anti-politics and a shared 
concern about public disengagement from politics.  Theorisation about anti-politics 
has been applied to an area of policy, namely localism, and in particular to the 
exercise of neighbourhood planning rights under the 2011 Localism Act, in the 
London boroughs.  The Act was intended to increase public engagement.  There 
appear to be three schools of thought or conceptualisations about anti-politics and 
each is examined in the context of research into how neighbourhood planning is 
working out in London, where there are known difficulties.  In reviewing the uneven 
London experience, evidence is found of a resistance by some councils.  The 
practicalities of a contra-localism are verifiable, with examples given of council policy 
and practice in promoting pre-existing top-down alternatives to neighbourhood 
planning.  Since active local authority support is usually required (especially so in 
London) to enable citizen groups to embark upon and develop neighbourhood 
planning, the simple withholding of support, in effect, denies the right to plan under 
the Localism Act.  It is asserted that this contra-localism may be symptomatic.   A 
more profound constitutional problem and democratic deficit in London borough 
governance (where there is surprisingly little research) may exist, amounting to a 
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distinct form of institutional anti-politics.  There is prima facie, but unverified, 
evidence (“informal” cabinets, popular misinterpretation of “political”, few opposition 
councillors, weak scrutiny, etc) of a depoliticisation process, exploiting and 
reinforcing disengagement.  The hypothesis of an institutional anti-politics is easy to 
suggest, but testing it presents a large scale anti-establishment project.  Further 
enquiry is however justified by the reality of London’s contra-localism, although two 
other direct explanations suggest themselves.
The ideological version of anti-politics, which ascribes an anti-political 
intention to neoliberal policies, supplies some apparently operational mechanisms of 
neoliberal ideology such as “public action versus self-regulation” (Schedler A. 1997).  
These generic ideas, or ideologies, do not hold up when applied to the actuality of 
neighbourhood planning.  Although earlier reviews of localism policy endorsed 
Schedler’s anti-political mechanisms, recent research strongly indicates that 
neighbourhood planning is positively engaging the public in political discourses and 
activities.  There is however a continuity of concern about neoliberal influence or 
intentions in localism.  A common theme exists of finding uneven take-up of planning 
rights, of unequal capacities to engage, and of a failure to achieve a broad 
representation across the diversity of groups.  A “progressive” form of 
neighbourhood planning has many proponents.  A clear definition of what 
progressive localism might look like is supplied by Healey p. (2015).  Although all 
political parties support localism, some differentiation in policy might be expected, 
but is not yet evident.  The contra-localism apparent in London might be based upon 
an ideological discernment and positioning, but the councils’ “duty to support” 
neighbourhood planning and the attraction of “power to the people” may be inhibiting 
any explicit dissent.  The policy community in London, such as the boroughs’ 
representative body, London Councils, has little to say about localism.  
The empirical theorisation of anti-politics supplies an alternative explanation of 
contra-localism.  Undoubtedly, neighbourhood planning does challenge the 
positional power and democratic authority of councillors and officers and this might 
help account for the very wide variation in responses from very pro, to very anti, 
despite the councils’ statutory duty to support neighbourhood planning.  The 
pragmatic perspective (and also process perspective) raises the key issue of 
deliberative democracy.  In the research on localism in London, the characterisation 
of neighbourhood planning which is most consistent and persuasive is, that here is 
deliberative democracy in action.  See for example Bradley Q. (2017).  Deliberative 
democracy conceptualisation is an outrider of empirical anti-politics theory.  The 
solution-oriented review of anti-politics by the British Academy (Stoker G. 2011) 
compares and contrasts the two remedies of reinvigorated representative democracy 
or the tonic of deliberative democracy.  The remedies are not mutually exclusive 
although Gerry Stoker inclines to the representative rather than deliberative option, 
“It should not be assumed that where there is evidence of anti-politics, what it means 
is that what people want is more opportunity to do more politics themselves” (Stoker 
G. 2017 p186).  But neighbourhood planning may be exactly that.  The territorial and 
conservative instincts of borough councils may resent any loss of control, to the 
extent of displaying wilful non-cooperation.  Aside from the issue of council 
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resistance, an obvious question arises as to why deliberative democracy has taken 
its theoretical turn (Owen D. and Smith G. 2016).  Neighbourhood planning is a step 
change in participation and, allegedly, “deliberation”, with over 2,500 groups 
engaged throughout England.  In the recent past there have been funded exercises 
in deliberative democracy while today the real thing goes unresearched.  The 
process perspective on anti-politics (Wood M. 2015) focusses on paradigm shift and 
thus introduces the topical question of “post-truth politics”.  Arguably the evidence 
suggests that neighbourhood planning is relatively popular, but not populist.  
Investing town planning with a degree of popular appeal might be considered a 
political achievement, even radical, but the paradigm is unchanged.  Wood’s 
mainstream ideas of social learning and deliberative democracy appear to be entirely 
characteristic of neighbourhood planning and this represents politicisation.  The 
value of neighbourhood planning as the field in which deliberative democracy can be 
researched is, in effect, endorsed, but social learning and neighbourhood planning 
groups as communities of practice are also worthy of research.
In the UK’s centralised state, Westminster is the magnet of attention for 
politicians, the media and political scientists alike.  Local government and local 
governance is generally neglected by researchers and ironically, London borough 
governance in particular.  Place-based and citizen-led as it is, the politics of localism 
is worthy of study with implications for anti-politics theory.  There are some 
fundamental questions such as, how far anti-politics might originate at the local level, 
in the conduct of local political parties and in town hall politics.  Conversely, how far 
might the “local polity” contribute to remedying anti-politics through neighbourhood 
planning and other forms of localism?  This paper attempts to identify issues and 
questions arising when citizens are offered and acquire formative and legitimate 
power over planning policy.  The politics of neighbourhood planning is not confined 
to the neighbourhood.
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